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FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION AND
AIRPORT NOISE CONTROL
Commercial air travel has produced great social and economic
benefits. Benefits derived from technological advances, however, are
seldom achieved without concomitant disadvantages. Extensive air-
plane service, including frequent flights day and night, has resulted
in a serious noise problem., Community displeasure with jet aircraft
noise has led in turn to a number of local efforts to reduce its impact
on airport neighbors.2
In response to complaints by those living nearby, the Burbank,
California, City Council enacted a curfew ordinance making it unlaw-
ful for jet aircraft to take off from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport
between 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.3 Lockheed, as airport proprietor,
filed suit in federal district court seeking to enjoin enforcement of
the ordinance.4 A permanent injunction was awarded and affirmed
1. The extent of the problem is reflected in the increasing amount of attention
by commentators. See, e.g., Anderson, Some Aspects of Airspace Trespass, 27 J.
Am L. & Cot. 341 (1960); Berger, Nobody Loves an Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. REv.
631 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Berger]; Cohen & Sharon, Noise and the Law:
A Survey, 11 DUQuEsNE L. Rav. 133 (1972); Kramon, Noise Control: Traditional
Remedies and a Proposal for Federal Action, 7 HAv. J. LEGIs. 533 (1970); Ten-
zer, Jet Aircraft Noise: Problems and Their Solutions, 13 N.Y.L.F. 465 (1967);
Tondel, Noise Litigation at Public Airports, 32 J. Am L. & Com. 387 (1966);
Note, Urban Noise Control, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoB. 105, 108-14 (1968);
Comment, Airport Noise: An Inadequate Judicial Response, 4 CONN. L. Rav.
634 (1972); Note, Jet Noise in Airport Areas: A National Solution Required,
51 MIN. L. RE-. 1087 (1967). For a discussion of studies relating to the severe
detrimental effects of excessive or unwanted noise see Comment, Sounding Brass:
Military Aircraft Noise Pollution, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 159, 185-91, app. I (1972).
See generally Vittek, Airport Noise Control-Can Communities Live Without It?
Can Airlines Live With It?, 38 J. Am L. & Co'm. 473 (1972).
2. See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.
1956); Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972); Amer-
ican Airlines, Inc. v. Audubon Park, 297 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Ky. 1968); Amer-
ican Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967);
Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d
548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964).
3. Burbank, Cal., Ordinance 2216, March 31, 1970. The ordinance also made
it unlawful for the airport operator to allow jet aircraft to depart during this
period, but made an exception for emergency flights if the permission of the city
police chief was obtained.
4. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D.
Cal. 1970).
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by the Ninth Circuit.5 In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
Inc.,6 the Supreme Court, four justices dissenting, held that the fed-
eral government had pre-empted the field of airport noise control and
that the local ordinance was impermissible.
Historical development of the federal pre-emption doctrine leaves
no doubt that Congress can, if it chooses, establish exclusive regula-
tory authority within any area in which it is constitutionally compe-
tent to act.7 The relevant question in each instance is whether the
legislation enacted either requires the federal government to be the
sole regulator or reflects a congressional intent that it be so.8 Con-
gress can be explicit in this respect,9 but seldom is.10 Consequently,
the courts must determine what Congress intended, if indeed it had
any intent at all regarding pre-emption. A variety of conceptual
tools have been developed to determine whether an intent to pre-empt
may be implied."-
In Gibbons v. Ogden,22 the Supreme Court broadly interpreted
federal pre-emptive power, stating that when Congress legislates on
5. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.
1972).
6. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
7. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), the Court said: "The test, therefore, is
whether the matter on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way reg-
ulated by the Federal Act. If it is, the federal scheme prevails though it is a more
modest, less pervasive regulatory plan than that of the State." Id. at 236.
8. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959);
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
9. See, e.g., The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970).
10. See Bikl6, The Silence of Congress, 41 HAIv. L. REv. 200 (1927); Powell,
Supreme Court Decisions on the Commerce Clause and State Police Power,
1910-1914 II, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 28 (1922); Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential
Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959). See
generally Note, "Occupation of the Field" in Commerce Clause Cases, 1936-46:
Ten Years of Federalism, 60 HARv. L. REv. 262 (1946).
11. In I-Enes v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), Justice Black said:
This Court . . . has made use of the following expressions: conflicting;
contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability;
inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. . . . In the final
analysis . . . [o]ur primary function is to determine whether, under the
circumstances . . . [the challenged regulation] stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.
Id. at 67.
12. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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a matter affecting interstate commerce it appropriates the entire field,
leaving no room for concurrent or supplementary state or local regu-
lation. Subsequent decisions have taken a more limited view; state
or local regulations designed to protect the health, safety and general
welfare of citizens have frequently been allowed to stand'1 Cooley
v. Board of lVardens," a leading case on the issue of federal pre-
emption, focused on the nature of the subject matter in setting forth
the following test: "Whatever subjects of this power are in their
nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of
regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require
exclusive legislation by Congress.""1 Another approach focuses on the
pervasiveness of federal legislation in the particular area. If the fed-
eral legislative scheme appears all-encompassing, a congressional intent
to preclude state or local action will be implied. 6
The Burbank Court, in discussing the nature of the air transporta-
tion system, pointed out that the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) is directed to insure a safe and efficient system of air trans-
portation, 7 as well as a technologically and economically feasible
method of noise abatement consistent with the need for safety.18 The
13. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963);
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); California
v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); South Carolina State H-ighway Dep't v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937); Willson
v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). For local regulations
not allowed to stand see Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) ; Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761 (1945); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); Napier v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926); Charleston & W. Carolina R.R.
v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915).
14. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
15. Id. at 319. This approach was expanded in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52 (1941), in which the Court said, "whether or not [the scheme] is of such a
nature that the Constitution permits only of one uniform national system, it can-
not be denied that the Congress might validly conclude that such uniformity is
desirable." Id. at 73.
16. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Northern States Power Co. v.
Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 5 Ill. App. 3d 800, 284 N.E.2d
342 (1972).
17. 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1970) provides: "The Administrator is authorized
and directed to . . . insure the safety of aircraft and the efficient utilization of
... (the navigable] airspace."
18. 411 U.S. at 639, citing 49 U.S.C. § 1431(d)(3) (Supp. II, 1972), which
provides that the FAA shall "consider whether any proposed standard or regu-
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interdependence of these factors, the Court believed, called for a uni-
form system of regulation. 19 An additional factor influencing the
Burbank Court was trial court testimony asserting that widespread
adoption of such curfews would result in bunched flights, increased
congestion, and a loss of efficiency. Necessary rescheduling would
aggravate noise levels during the periods of greatest annoyance. These
consequences, the Court stated, would be totally inconsistent with
federal policy.
20
The Court also considered the pervasiveness of federal legislation
designed to control and abate airport noise.2" It noted that by a July
1968 amendment to the Federal Aviation Act,"2 the FAA Administra-
tor was directed to take steps toward the control and abatement of
aircraft noise.23 The Administrator's responsibilities were extended
under the Noise Control Act of 1972,24 which also directed the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) to participate in decision-mak-
ing as part of what the Court described as "the comprehensive scheme
of federal control of the aircraft noise problem.""5
The Burbank dissent agreed that Congress could pre-empt the field
of airport noise control if it wished, and that the 1968 amendment
to the Federal Aviation Act had probably given the Administrator
sufficient authority to promulgate regulations pre-empting local ac-
tion, but felt that a clear and manifest purpose to prohibit the exer-
lation is consistent with the highest degree of safety in air commerce or air
transportation in the public interest." 49 U.S.C. § 1431(d) (4) (Supp. II, 1972)
further requires the FAA to determine "whether any proposed standard or regu-
lation is economically reasonable, technologically practicable, and appropriate for
the particular type of aircraft, aircraft engine, appliance, or certificate to which it
will apply."
19. 411 U.S. at 639.
20. Id. at 627-28. See also EPA, PEPORT TO THXE PRVSIDENT AND CONoRESS
ON NoxsE, S. Doe. No. 92-63, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT ON NossE].
21. 411 U.S. at 633.
22. 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. II, 1972).
The amendment, titled "Control and Abatement of Aircraft Noise and Sonic
Boom" reads in pertinent part:
In order to afford present and future relief and protection to the public...
from aircraft noise and sonic boom... [the Administrator] shall prescribe and
amend . . . such regulations as [he] may find necessary to provide for the
control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom. ...
23. Id. § 1431(a), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
24. 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. II, 1972). amending 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970).
25. 411 U.S. at 628-29.
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cise of the local police powers must appear on the face of the statute
or in the legislative history before an intent to pre-empt could be
implied. The dissent then concluded that nothing in the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 or the 1968 Noise Abatement Amendment indi-
cated such intent. Since the dissent believed that the Noise Control
Act of 1972 merely altered inter-governmental procedures for dealing
with aircraft noise problems, the Act could not be read as altering
the status quo.2 The legislative history of the 1968 amendment in-
cluded a comment from the House Report stating that the bill was
directed at the "reduction of noise at its source."27 The dissent con-
cluded from this that Congress intended the federal government's role
to be limited soley to the study and regulation of the technical aspects
of jet engine and aircraft design.28
An examination of the statutory scheme and its legislative history
reveals conflicting language and opinions that would support either
the majority or the dissent. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 by itself
was not meant to pre-empt the area of aircraft noise control. High
noise levels and resulting complaints were not common until after
the introduction of jet aircraft for commercial use in late 1958.29
Congress' paramount concern at the time was to consolidate control
over aviation in one agency of the Executive Branch in the interest
of safety and efficiency. To that end, Congress pre-empted control
of the navigable airspace 0 and charged the Administrator with its
management. 31
26. Id. at 652.
27. Id. at 647, citing H.R. REP. No. 1463, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968).
28. 411 U.S. at 650.
29. REPORT oN NoisE 2-52:
The growth of community noise levels due to commercial aircraft operations
is closely related to the introduction of the commercial jet aircraft in 1958
and the growth of air travel during the following decade. First, the jet air-
craft were noisier ...than piston-engined aircraft they replaced. Secondly,
although the number of major airports has increased only slightly since the
late 1950's, the quantity and frequency of air travel has grown many times
over. Finally, vast new residential communities have been established in the
vicinity of nearly all busy airports. This combination of expanding air travel
and residential growth has resulted in a growing airport-community noise
problem.
30. 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (1970) provides in part that "the United States of
America is declared to possess and exercise complete and exclusive national
sovereignty in the airspace of the United States .... "1
31. 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1970) gave the Administrator broad power "to
insure the safety of aircraft and the efficient utilization of ...[the navigable]
airspace."
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The legislative history of the 1968 Noise Abatement Amendment,
on the other hand, indicates serious concern with the problems of
aircraft noise and its control.32 The House Report 3 mentions three
methods of attacking the problem: changed engine design, new flight
techniques and procedures, and plans for compatible land use in
areas adjacent to airports. Requiring altered engine designs is within
the competence and power of the FAA,84 while land use planning is
traditionally a function of state and local governments.85 Control
and coordination of interstate flight techniques and procedures, how-
ever, requires federal authority with the capacity to develop a national
plan.38
The Noise Control Act of 197237 is the most recent and compre-
hensive congressional statement on the matter. The Burbank majority
concluded that its provisions made dear that the FAA, in conjunc-
tion with EPA, has complete control over aircraft noise, precluding
state or local action.38 The dissent, however, pointed to remarks in
the Senate Report evincing an intent to maintain a status quo that
the dissent interpreted as non-pre-emption. The Report states:
[C]ertain actions by State and local public agencies, such as zon-
ing to assure compatible land use, are a necessary part of the total
attack on aircraft noise In this connection the question is raised
whether this bill adds or subtracts anything from the powers of
State or local governments. It is not the intent of the committee
... to effect any change in the existing apportionment of power
between the Federal and State and local governments. 8
It is more probable that this disclaimer of pre-emption was addressed
to the land use issue than to the authority of localities to enact
ordinances directly or indirectly affecting aircraft flight.
32. S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2688 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
S. REP. No. 1353].
33. H.R. RmP. No. 1463, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968).
34. See S. RP. No. 1353 at 5. See also 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(4) (1970), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1431(d)(4) (Supp. II, 1972).
35. See Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965); Gold-
blatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
36. S. REP. No. 1353 at 5-6 states: "Because of the relationship between
noise regulations and safety. . . , the House concluded that responsibility for noise
regulation should be placed directly with the Administrator. . . . The ultimate
policy decisions on aircraft noise abatement will continue to be the province of
the Secretary [of Transportation]."
37. 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970).
38. 411 U.S. at 633.
39. S. REP. No. 1353 at 6 (emphasis added).
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In spite of contrary or ambiguous statements regarding pre-emption,
the history and pervasiveness of federal legislation in the area of air-
craft noise control favors the result reached by the Burbank Court.
If, as the dissent maintains, it were necessary to find an expression
of the intent to pre-empt the exercise of the local police powers, the
courts would never have to imply it. In this instance, the need for
national uniformity in regulating air transportation, the pervasive
legislative scheme, and the evils that would flow from diverse local
rules make the judicial implication of an intent to pre-empt a fair
one.
The Court's decision in Burbank, one more frustration for residents
of communities surrounding airports, was foreshadowed by the ma-
jority of lower court opinions dealing with similar local efforts.40
Prior to the introduction of commercial jets in 1958, Cedarhurst,
New York, seeking relief from the noise of landings and departures
at Kennedy International Airport, passed an ordinance barring over-
flights below a certain altitude. In Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village
of Cedarhurst,41 the Second Circuit held the ordinance pre-empted
on the ground that the federal government had assumed exclusive
control of the navigable air space.42 After Cedarhurst's failure, Hemp-
stead, New York, also a Kennedy neighbor, tried another approach.
As part of a comprehensive scheme of noise control, the town enacted
an ordinance providing for penalties if the noise, measured at sur-
face level, exceeded permissible limits. In American Airlines, Inc. v.
Town of Hempstead,43 a federal district court held that, since the
aircraft and its noise were indivisible, to bar the noise was to bar the
aircraft. 4 I The court said that the ordinance operated in an area
40. See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (2d
Cir. 1956); American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226
(E.D.N.Y. 1967); City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 750
(D.N.J. 1958); Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d
582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964). Contra, Stagg v. Municipal Court,
2 Cal. App. 3d 318, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
41. 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
42. Id. at 815. One commentator points out that compliance with the Cedar-
hurst ordinance would have been possible by re-routing air traffic, but it was
feared that similar action by other communities would follow, making it im-
possible for the airport to function. Berger 705-06.
43. 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
44. Id. at 230. For an ingenuous argument that the aircraft and its noise are
divisible see Berger 709-11.
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committed to federal care, and that noise-limiting rules of this sort
must come from a federal source.45 The court also expressed concern
over the effect on air transportation if the ordinance were upheld
and other communities followed suit. Viewed as only one of many
such ordinances enacted by communities surrounding the airports, it
was apparent to the court that the ordinance would be, in effect, a
significant regulation of aircraft flight since alternate routes would be
unavailable.46
Localities are now clearly precluded from imposing altitude,47
noise level, 48 or hours limitations9 on aircraft. Whether any powers
are retained by municipalities acting not in their governmental capac-
ity but in their proprietary role as owners and operators of airports
remains unanswered.50 The few instances in which the issue has been
raised leave little reason to believe that municipal operators of air-
ports will be in any better position than the City of Burbank.
The experience of the San Diego airport authority illustrates how
difficult it is for a municipality operating an airport to impose certain
restrictions. In 1967, due to increasing infractions by commercial air-
lines of a gentleman's agreement to avoid takeoffs and departures
between 12:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., the airport's attorney proposed an
ordinance placing a limit on the hours of operation.' When the FAA
indicated that the proposed restriction would violate commitments
under the city's Federal Aid to Airports grant, San Diego abandoned
the curfew plan.52
45. 272 F. Supp. at 231.
46. Id. at 231-32.
47. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.
1956).
48. American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y.
1967).
49. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
50. Id. at 635-36 n.14, which reads in part:
But, we are concerned here not with an ordinance imposed by the City of
Burbank as "proprietor" of the airport, but with the exercise of police power.
While the Hollywood-Burbank Airport may be the only major airport which
is privately owned, many airports are owned by one municipality yet physi-
cally located in another .... Thus, authority that a municipality may have
as a landlord is not necessarily congruent with its police power. We do not
consider here what limits, if any, apply to a municipality as a proprietor.
51. Berger 717.
52. Id. But see the position taken by the FAA in In re Dreifus, FAA Regula-
tory Docket No. 9071 (July 10, 1969), cited in Berger 718 n.355, in which the
FAA apparently sought to avoid issuance of noise regulations for Santa Monica
on the ground that it was up to the airport operator.
[Vol. 8:229
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The Port Authority of New York, as operator of La Guardia Air-
port, appears at first glance to have fared somewhat better than its
San Diego counterpart. In Port of New York Authority v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 3 plaintiff obtained an injunction barring use of two
runways as a noise abatement measure, in spite of an FAA order mak-
ing the runways available (albeit of last priority) in its scheme of
preferential runways. A close analysis of the federal district court's
opinion, however, reveals a hollow victory and potentially severe re-
strictions on the proprietor's power to regulate flights in order to
control noise. Although granting the Port Authority's request, the
court limited the injunction to such time as two new runways could
be completed. The court also stated that, should wind conditions be
adverse and the Port Authority unable to arrange landings at alter-
nate airports nearby, use of those runways would be required.54 The
court mentioned that it was unnecessary to determine whether the
FAA had the power to pre-empt decisions regarding runway pref-
erences since the agency had not attemped to do so. 5
After Burbank, it appears most likely that airport operators, re-
gardless of their status, will be left with whatever marginal controls
can be exercised through runway planning and utilization, and then
only so long as such controls meet with FAA approval.5 6 In light of
the Supreme Court decision in Griggs v. Allegheny County, 7 placing
the locus of liability for damage resulting from aircraft noise on the
municipal airport operator rather than on either the federal govern-
ment or the commercial airlines, the operator apparently bears the
burden of compensating injured parties for the consequences of an
activity over which the airport has little control., Localities must
now apparently look to the FAA for relief. Certainly the power to
53. 259 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). By Port Authority regulation, aircraft
were temporarily prohibited from taking off on runway 22 and landing on runway
four. The regulaton coincided with an order of the FAA, however, issued on Octo-
ber 8, 1962, which provided an exception to the prohibition should a pilot de-
cide the runway's use to be necessary in the interest of safety. Id. at 749.
54. Id. at 754.
55. Id. at 752.
56. REPoar ON NoIsE 4-28.
57. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
58. REPORT ON NoIsE 4-25 to -28. See also Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369
U.S. 84, 91 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting).
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act has been granted the FAA by the extensive legislative scheme.rs
Yet there is ample room for concern whether the FAA will prove
willing to impose costly requirements upon a powerful industry.00 The
FAA has been criticized as being more a captive than a regulator
of the airline industry, and it may be reluctant to exercise its authority
to alleviate airport noise.1
Recent federal legislation establishes a mechanism that may push
the FAA in the direction of more effective control of airport noise.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,2 adopted in re-
sponse to the critical need for a national approach to environmental
problems, requires all federal agencies to commit themselves to care-
ful examination of activities under their control in order to minimize
adverse environmental impacts. To this end, the Act also created
the Council on Environmental Quality to review and appraise fed-
eral programs . 3 The Noise Pollution and Abatement Act of 19704
established within EPA an office charged with investigation of the
effects of noise on public health and welfare. By its terms, any federal
59. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra. Several commentators have
argued that only federal control can provide effective solutions to the aircraft
noise problem; see, e.g., Hildebrand, Noise Pollution: An Introduction to the
Problem and an Outline for Future Legal Research, 70 CoLuMa. L. REv. 652
(1970); Tondel, Noise Litigation at Public Airports, 32 J. Am L. & Cor. 387
(1966); Note, Jet Noise in Airport Areas: A National Solution Required, 51
MhiN. L. Rtv. 1087 (1967).
60. Note, Federal Regulation of Air Transportation and the Environmental
Impact Problem, 35 U. Cmr. L. REv. 317, 338 (1968).
61. In the opinion of one expert, a substantially quieter jet engine is well
within the state of the art but does not exist because there is no economic in-
centive for its development on the part of the airlines, and because no local unit
of government has the power to require the production and use of quieter aircraft.
Address by Fisher to the Society of Automotive Engineers, April 3-5, 1968, cited in
Berger 710 n.321; S. REP. No. 1353 at 5.
In support of this view, another commentator points out: "The principal
forces which move private enterprise are profits and regulations. There are no
profits in reducing noise and there are no regulations to control it." Letter from
E. Thomas Burnard to Senator A. S. Monroney, June 25, 1968, reprinted in
Hearings on S. 707, H.R. 3400, Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Commerce
Comm. on Transportation and Aeronautics, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 90-72, 81-86
(1968). But see 34 Fed. Reg. 453, 456 (1969); 35 Fed. Reg. 16980 (1970).
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970). Section 4332(2) (c) orders all agencies of
the federal government to "consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal
agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any
environmental impact involved." See also Cohen & Sharon, supra note 1, at 159.
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342, 4344 (1970).
64. Id. § 1858.
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agency in control of a noise-producing activity determined objection-
able by the agency's standards must discuss with the EPA Administra-
tor possible means of abatement. In addition, the Noise Control
Act of 1972G5 specifically requires the FAA, after consultation with
the Secretary of Transportation and with EPA, to establish aircraft
noise standards. The Act also requires that EPA submit to the FAA
proposed regulations considered necessary for protection of the pub-
lic. 6 These recent statutes dearly illustrate that excessive and un-
wanted noise is a serious environmental problem worthy of immedi-
ate and effective attention. Under all three Acts, the duty of the FAA
to take action toward alleviating the jet aircraft noise problem has
been established. More importantly, the FAA must now comply
with standards imposed from without by those federal agencies whose
primary concern is the quality of the environment.
Burbank severely limits the ability of airport proprietors, under
pressure from disgruntled neighbors, to initiate any short-term, effec-
tive solutions to the noise problem. Local attempts to deal with noise
problems have been struck down in favor of pre-emptive federal
authority. Community opposition to much needed expansion of air-
port facilities may therefore be exacerbated by the lack of local power
to assume any control over the resultant noise problem. Nevertheless,
substantive procedures to deal with jet aircraft noise exist at the fed-
eral level. The FAA must develop affirmative plans to abate airport
noise-plans that meet with the approval of federal agencies hope-
fully more responsive to the public interest. The Burbank Court
correctly points out that a fragmental approach is inappropriate when
dealing with the nationwide air traffic industry since safety and
efficiency are critical concerns. It remains to be seen, however, whether
relief for airport neighbors will be forthcoming from those federal
agencies committed, at least statutorily, to finding a solution to the
problem of airport noise pollution.
Barbara Harris Jablonski
65. 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970).
66. Id. § 1431 (c)(1), amending 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970).
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